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Abstract: There are two compensation methods for 
interruptible loads (ILs), namely low price compensation 
before supply unavailability and high price compensation 
after supply unavailability. Low price compensation is 
independent of power supply unavailability, while the high 
compensation is performed only after actual power supply 
unavailability. However, the IL with low price (ILL) and the 
IL with high price compensation (ILH) have only been studied 
separately till now. Based on risk management, this paper 
analyzes the different economic properties of the two 
compensation methods and concludes that their coordination 
is beneficial to restrain market power and reduce the cost of 
reserve capacity. The authors propose the coordination 
models and optimization algorithms by taking the sum of the 
deterministic reduction of revenue resulting from ILL and the 
risk of compensating ILH as the objective function. 
Simulation results are presented to validate the effectiveness 
of the proposed method. 
Key words: interruptible load with low price (ILL); interruptible 
load with high compensation (ILH); risk management; 
coordinative optimization; electricity market 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It has been identified that system capacity fault has high 
level of uncertainty and serious impact on the electricity 
market [1-2], and therefore  appropriate system reserve 
capacity is very important and extensive research has been 
carried out in this area. The authors of [3] show that reserve 
capacity of the supply side and interruptible load (IL) 
capacity of the demand side can be purchased in order to 
improve the overall generation capacity adequacy. IL can 
be employed as emergency reserve capacity resource, 
especially for dealing with capacity fault with low 
probability and high risks. Introduction IL into the reserve 
capacity market is therefore of great importance [4]. 
So far, IL services have attracted significant attention 
from both academia and industry. The existing research 
broadly falls into two main categories. A major research 
problem of IL services is to design appropriate incentive 
rate structures for customers to participant voluntarily in to 
the IL programs. IL services are equivalent to forward 
contracts bundled with a call option, [5]. A comprehensive 
analysis of such contracts is presented in [5] as well. A 
double call option is introduced in [6] to account for the 
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effect of early notification of curtailment. In [7] and [8], 
optimal incentive-rate structures are designed for IL 
contracts using mechanism-design theory. 
Another category of IL research focuses on evaluating 
the influences of IL services on the whole market. In [9], a 
technique is proposed to evaluate how IL services can 
improve the operating benefits of a composite generation 
and transmission system. Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) 
simulation is employed in [10] to analyze the effects of IL 
services. In [11], a method is proposed to optimize the 
generation and demand-reduction scheduling in an 
electricity market considering ILs. 
IL contracts have been widely practiced in many 
countries through their reserve markets. According to 
North America Electricity Reliability Council (NERC) 
Operating Policy − 10, interruptible load management 
(ILM) is recognized as one of the contingency reserve 
services, [12]. New York ISO (NYISO) has an interruptible 
load scheme to encourage its customers to reduce their 
demand during peak hours [13]. In Albert Power Pool of 
Canada, customers can offer IL services as an additional 
operation reserve to the pool [14]. PJM market also 
provides a load reduction program by which customers 
may be compensated for voluntarily load reduction during 
emergency situations [15]. In the UK electricity market, IL 
service providers are encouraged to compete with 
generators in the provision of all types of reserve services 
[16]. In the Australian National Electricity Market (NEM), 
scheduled load (interruptible load) is recognized both as a 
frequency control ancillary service and a network loading 
control ancillary service [17]. IL option has been offered to 
contestable consumers in the National Electricity Market of 
Singapore from 1 January 2003 [18]. Similarly, Taipower 
employs a program for load shedding and relevant 
compensation when tripping a large unit during peak [19].  
In order to encourage IL to participate in system reserve, 
discount price for interruptible loads before capacity fault 
during emergency [20-22] and high compensation after 
capacity fault approaches [21-23] are widely used. Low 
price interruptible load (ILL) is compensated by price 
discount before the fault in order to get interruptible option 
of load. High compensation interruptible load (ILH) is 
compensated after faults and interruption actions. However, 
to the best of the authors knowledge, no research has been 
conducted to integrate ILL and ILH methods till now.  
Because ILH incurs no fees when there are no faults and 
interruption actions, it is more economical to deal with the 
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capacity faults with small probability and high risk. 
However, the compensation risk of ILH is relatively high 
for capacity faults with higher probability. The economical 
property of ILL is on the contrary compared with that of 
ILH. Obviously, to cope with all kinds of possible capacity 
faults, both methods are important because they are 
mutually complementary to each other. Very similar to the 
case of preventive control and emergency control for power 
system stability in [24], the ILL method of low electricity 
fee losses before capacity fault and the ILH method of high 
compensation risk after capacity fault can be coordinated 
by risk management methods. Thus the economical 
effectiveness of coordination of the two methods is much 
better than using of ILL or ILH alone 
This paper unifies security and economy of a power 
system by formulating an optimization problem. The 
objective function of this problem includes proper pricing 
of system security. Coordination model of demand side 
reserve service market is established and solved as well. 
The coordination between IL reserve service market and 
supply-side reserve capacity market has been developed by 
the authors in [25]. 
II.  ECONOMIC AND MUTUALLY 
COMPLEMENTARY PROPERTY OF THE TWO 
METHODS 
ILL method obtains the interruptible option of IL by 
electricity price discount at the commencement of trading 
.The electricity tariff lost due to discount can be attributed 
to regular certain cost because this cost is independent of 
the occurrence of capacity faults. The amount of discount is 
correlated with the reliability specified in power supply 
contracts. ILL method does not compensate customer for 
the capacity faults when the contracts are effective. 
However, no matter whether the capacity faults occur or 
not, the losses caused by discount is fixed. 
When ILH method is employed, the electricity is traded 
in normal price. ILH is compensated after implement of 
interruption action according to contracts. This kind of 
compensation can be attributed to risk costs which are 
relevant to the probability of faults. 
ILL and ILH can respectively bid into the reserve 
service market according to market rules. The trading 
objective of ILL and ILH markets is interruptible option of 
IL. Both ILL and ILH are interrupted after capacity faults, 
from the aspect of their physical properties they should be 
categorized as emergency or corrective control. Table 1 
compares these two market inducement methods both 
economically and physically. 
Demand-side reserve service market consists of a 
reserve management centre and customers. Reserve 
management centre is responsible for enabling trading in IL 
market. Customers participate in IL marketing bidding 
according to equally incremental interruptible cost criteria. 
By employing IL market, the market power of supply-side 
market can be greatly restrained, and the total cost of 
purchasing reserve capacity is lower. Moreover, the risk of 
the serious capacity faults with small probability can be 
greatly reduced as well. 
 
 
TABLE 1 COMPARISON OF TWO IL COMPENSATION METHODS 
Economic layer Physical Layer Compensation 
methods Trading object Trading  period Trading Methods 
Economic 
property 
Unit 
cost 
Control 
Action 
Control 
property 
ILL Shorter Price discount before blackout Certain Lower  
ILH 
Interruptible 
option of real 
time load Longer Compensation 
after blackout risk Higher 
After 
blackout 
Emergency or 
corrective 
control 
III.  ECONOMIC LOSSES OF TRANSMISSION COMPANY IN 
THE ILL MARKET 
In this section, let 0p  be the normal price of 
electricity. iQ  is the interruptible capacity of customer 
i traded in the transaction. lQ  is the interruptible capacity 
that a company needs to purchase. )( ii Qd  is average 
reducing rate of electricity price of customer i  in the ILL 
market. )( ii Qd is the incremental function of iQ  
( maxmin iii QQQ ≤≤ ), such as iii Qvu +  with positive 
intercept iu  and slope iv , as shown in Fig.1. iu  and 
iv  are bidding strategies of customer i  in the ILL market 
and can be constant in extreme cases. The loss of electricity 
fee of the grid company for customer i  is 
iiiii QQdpQC )()( 0=  which is the incremental function 
of iQ . When id  is constant, )( ii QC  is a half radial 
with slope idp0 . 
When a company purchases lQ  from the ILL market, 
the objective is to obtain the minimum loss of electricity 
fee occurred in trading with all ILL customers. This cost 
minimization problem can be formulated as 
∑ ×
i
iii QQdp )(min 0                 (1) 
 ..ts  l
i
i QQ =∑                      (2) 
maxmin
iii QQQ ≤≤       i∀       (3) 
Eqs. (1) and (2) can be solved regardless of (3) by the 
Lagrange multiplier method, as follows, 
∑
∑+
=
i i
i i
i
l
vp
v
uQ
02
1
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where λ  is the Lagrange multiplier. Taking the 
non-equality constraint (3) into account, if minii QQ ≤ , set 
min
ii QQ = ; if maxii QQ ≥ , set maxii QQ = . λ  and 
interruptible capacity of other ILL can be recalculated 
using (4) and (5) till (3) is satisfied. During zt  period, the 
loss of electricity fee of a company for purchasing 
interruptible option of lQ is defined as the cost of ILL 
reserve service, which can be formulated as follows, 
z
i
iiill tQQdpQC ∑= )()( 0               (6) 
max
iQ iQ
max
id
)( ii Qd
min
id
min
iQ
 
Fig.1 Bidding curve for price discount rate of ILL customer i  
IV.  COMPENSATION RISK IN THE ILH MARKET 
A. Interruption Cost of ILH 
In this section, we let jQ be the interruptible capacity 
of customer j traded in an ILH market transaction. mhQ , is 
the interruptible capacity that a company needs to 
purchase. )( jj Qh  is a high compensation multiple of 
customer j  in the ILH market. Its is the ratio of unit 
interruption cost to 0p . )( jj Qh  is the incremental 
function of jQ  ( maxmin jjj QQQ ≤≤ ), such as 
jjj Qβα +  with positive intercept jα  and slope jβ , 
as shown in Fig.2. jα  and jβ  are bidding strategies of 
customer j  in the ILL market and can be constants in 
extreme cases. The Compensation expense of company to 
customer j  is jjjjj QQhpQC )()( 0= , which is 
incremental function of jQ .When jh  is constant, 
)( jj QC  is a half radial with slope jhp0 . 
In the ILL market, when a company purchases mhQ , for 
the individual fault m , the objective is to obtain the 
minimum compensation expenses occurred in trading with 
all ILH customers. This cost minimization problem can be 
formulated as, 
jj
j
j QQhp ×∑ )(min 0 ,   (7) 
..ts  mh
j
j QQ ,=∑ ,      (8) 
maxmin
jjj QQQ ≤≤ ,     j∀ , (9) 
The solution procedure to find the interruptible capacity 
of each ILH from (7) and (8) is similar to that of (4) and 
(5). If the capacity mhQ , is interrupted, its compensation 
cost can be calculated as, 
j
j
jjmd QQhpL ∑= )(0, .      (10) 
B. Interruption Compensation Risk 
Interruption compensation risk is defined as the cost of 
ILH reserve service. For a fault set M , compensation risk 
can be formulated as 
m
Mm
mdmh tLqC ∑
∈
=
,
,    (11) 
where mq  is the occurrence probability of fault m . mt  is 
the duration of fault m . 
 
max
jQ jQ
max
jh
)( jj Qh
min
jh
min
jQ
 
Fig.2 Bidding curve for high compensation multiple of ILH customer j  
V.  THE PROPOSED ILL-ILH COORDINATION MODEL 
A. Model Formulation 
In an IL market, the optimal trading quantities 
( mhl QQ ,, ) in ILL and ILH markets, can be achieved by 
using mutually complementary property of ILL and ILH 
economic compensation methods and their supply curves. 
Objective function of the proposed coordination model is 
the minimum of total compensation cost C , which is the 
sum of the loss of electricity fee )( ll QC  and the 
compensation risks hC  caused by all interruption faults. 
IL capacity equation condition and available capacity of IL 
market inequality condition are included in the constraints. 
The over all ILL-ILH coordination model can be expressed 
as follows, 










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≤≤
≤≤
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B. Model Characteristics 
According to different trading methods, this 
coordination model considers the loss of electricity fee of 
ILL capacity as certain cost, and the compensation risk is 
taken as risk cost. By introducing risk management and 
coordinative optimization, the objective function of the 
proposed model is to minimize the sum of the loss of 
electricity tariff and compensation risks wholistically.  
C. Solution to the Coordination Problem 
The solution to the coordination problem in this model 
is illustrated in Fig. 3. When lQ  goes up, lC  
monotonically increases. With the increment of lQ , mhQ ,  
decreases and consequently hC drops monotonically. Total 
cost curve C  has a positive second-order derivative with 
respect to lQ . Therefore, the minimum of C , minC , is 
achieved at olQ . , which is the optimal trading capacity of 
ILL. In Fig. 3, point B corresponds to the cost of 
purchasing IL completely from ILH market, while point C 
corresponds to that of the ILL market.  
To solve this problem, the first step is to obtain lC  and 
hC  curves in the ILL and ILH markets respectively. 
Secondly, minC , olC .  and ohC . will be calculated. 
Finally, olQ .  and mhQ ,  can be achieved in ILL and ILH 
market.  
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Fig.3 Coordinative optimization between ILL and ILH 
For computation simplicity, the complete curves of lC  
and hC are not calculated here. Instead, numerical 
sensitivity analysis is employed here to search the point 
of 0)( =
l
l
dQ
QdC
, which corresponds to ),( min. CQ ol . 
During the iteration, the initial value of lQ  can be set as a 
certain percent of the maximum of all mhQ , in the fault set. 
The step length and convergence threshold can be selected 
according to precision requirement. 
VI.  CASE STUDIES 
A. Simulation Setting 
In the case studies, 0p  is 400 RMB¥/MWh and zt is 
set to be 24 hours. Parameters of ILL and ILH market are 
shown in Tables 2 and 3. Table 4 contains information of 
the fault set. 
TABLE 2 PARAMETERS OF THE ILL MARKET 
Consumer i 1 2 3 4 
Minimum of interruptible capacity 
(MW) 0 0 0 0 
Maximum of interruptible 
capacity(MW) 20 40 40 60 
Bidding strategy iv  0.005 0.01 0.012 0.015 
 
TABLE 3 PARAMETERS OF THE ILH MARKET 
Consumer j 5 6 7 8 
Minimum of interruptible capacity(MW) 0 0 0 0 
Maximum of interruptible capacity(MW) 15 40 45 60 
Bidding strategy jβ  1 2 3 4 
 
TABLE 4 FAULT SCENARIOS 
Fault 
m 
probability Total interruptible capacity/MW Persistence time/h 
1 0.050 50 3 
2 0.015 100 5 
3 0.005 150 7 
B. Economic Comparison of Different Schemes 
There are three schemes for purchasing of IL capacity. 
Scheme 1: only purchase ILL capacity； 
Scheme 2: only purchase ILH capacity;  
Scheme 3: optimized purchasing of ILL and ILH 
capacities.  
The costs of each scheme at each given individual fault 
are shown in Table 5. From Table 5, we can see that for 
fault 1 with high probability, it is more economical to 
purchase ILL than to purchase ILH. However, for the fault 
3 with small probability, purchasing ILH is more 
economical than purchasing ILL. It can also be clearly seen 
that the coordination method is much more economical for 
all faults. 
 
TABLE 5 COST OF THREE SCHEMES FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL FAULT 
Fault 
m 
Scheme 1 (ILL) 
Cost (1,000 RMB) 
Scheme 2 (ILH) 
Cost (1,000RMB) 
Scheme 3 
(coordination)  
Cost (1,000RMB) 
1 53.7 81.3 30.6 
2 264.9 206.8 93.9 
3 717.1 273.0 150.2 
C. Key Factors Which may Affect the Outcome of the 
Coordination Model 
1) INFLUENCE OF BIDDING STRATEGY 
The relationship between the bidding strategies of 
consumers and the trading quantity in the ILH market is 
demonstrated in Fig.4. With the increase of iv (or jβ ) , 
the equally incremental ratio of the loss of electricity fee in 
the ILL market (or compensation risk in the ILH market) 
will increase. According to equally incremental cost 
criteria, the trading quantity of ILH market will increase (or 
decrease). The relationship between the bidding strategy of 
each consumer and distribution of trading quantity in ILL 
market can also be analyzed by this method. 
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Fig.4 Variation curve of trading quantity with different bidding strategies in 
the ILH market 
 
2) INFLUENCE OF FAULT PROBABILITY 
The relationship between the probability of fault 1, 
which is 1q , and optimal trading quantity is shown in Fig.5 
(a) and the relationship between 1q and the total cost, C , 
is shown in Fig.5 (b). When 1q  increases, the optimal ILL 
capacity lQ also increases. The economy of ILH 
compensation method will decrease accordingly. It can also 
be seen that the compensation risk is relevant to both 
compensation probability and compensation intensity (or 
ILH capacity). This combined influence makes )( 1qCh  
first increase and then decrease with the increment of 1q . 
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(a) Influence on the optimal trading quantity  
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(b) Influence on the total cost 
Fig.5 Influence of the fault probability 
 
D. Optimal Decision on ILL Capacity 
The relationship between the total compensation cost 
and ILL capacity for each individual fault is illustrated in 
Fig. 6. The optimal configuration for the three faults is 
{28.72，47.23，48.96} MW and the corresponding total 
cost is {3.06，93.9，150.2} (× RMB¥1,000). Obviously, 
the higher the compensation risk is, the greater the optimal 
ILL capacity will be. 
All faults must be considered when designing ILL 
capacity schemes. The outcome of the above case is shown 
in Fig.6. Optimal ILL capacity is 60 MW and total 
compensation cost is 180.5 (¥1,000RMB). Accordingly, 
the losses of electricity fee and compensation risks are 80.6 
and 99.9 (¥1,000RMB) respectively. 
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Fig.6 Optimal ILL capacity for individual fault 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
This paper proposes a coordinative method for 
interruptible load trading in an electricity to enhance 
system reliability. By introducing risk management and 
coordination optimization, An efficient method has been 
developed by using IL effectively in an electricity market. 
The proposed method can greatly enhance the economic 
benefit of the demand-side reserve market. A theoretical 
foundation is established for coordinating the demand-side 
and the supply-side reserve markets using the different 
economic property of ILL and ILH. The optimization 
problem is formulated by minimizing the sum of the losses 
resulted from ILL and compensation risks of ILH. 
Preliminary analysis has shown that the method can 
improve the market efficiency of demand-side reserve 
market. It can also  provide market signals serving as 
incentives to potential market participants for better system 
reliability and security. The proposed method is tested with 
case studies based on a particular electricity market.  
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